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Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve
Professional Responsibility
Victor H. Kramer*
In August, 1983, controversial amendments to Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective. Rule 11
now provides that when an attorney or a party signs a paper
filed in connection with a lawsuit, the signature certifies that,
to the best of the signer's knowledge, the paper "is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument"1 for a change in the law, and that it is not in-
terposed "to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation."2 Rule 11 further provides
that if an attorney files a paper in violation of the Rule, the
court "shall impose" on the attorney, the client, or both "an ap-
propriate sanction. ' 3 Under this provision, courts may require
the violating party to pay the other party's "reasonable ex-
penses incurred because of the filing" of the unwarranted pa-
per, "including a reasonable attorney's fee."'4
In the seven years since Rule 11 was amended, it has gen-
erated well over a thousand judicial opinions,5 and a growing
body of articles that fiercely debate the advantages and disad-
vantages of Rule 11.6 Opponents of Rule 11 rely on two princi-
* Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Adjunct Profes-
sor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to my col-
league, Professor Jack Cound, for his helpful advice in the preparation of this
Essay.
1. FmD. R. Crv. P. 11, reprinted in 2A J. MOORE, J. LucAs & G. GRO-
THEER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE % 11.01 (2d ed. 1987).
2. Id-
3. I&
4. Id
5. See Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 199 (1988);
Note, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE L.J. 901 (1988).
6. Rule 11 is giving rise to a burgeoning literature published in Federal
Rules Decisions and in both the academic law reviews as well as periodicals
sponsored by bar associations and other groups. See bibliography in COMMIT-
TEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., CALL
FOR WRITTEN COMMENTS ON RULE 11 OF THE F.R.C.P. & RELATED RULES 7-16
(1990).
In its recent opinion in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447
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pal criticisms. One criticism is that the Rule chills litigation by
deserving plaintiffs - particularly in the civil rights and em-
ployment discrimination areas.7 A second criticism is that Rule
11 generates satellite litigation over the propriety of Rule 11
sanctions, thus increasing rather than decreasing the cost and
complexity of litigation in the federal courts.8 The conflict sur-
rounding Rule 11 also has invaded the federal courts. The vari-
ous circuits disagree over what constitutes a Rule 11 violation
and what is the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions. The following
Table supports some of the differences that exist among the
circuits.9
(1990), the Court cited the following from this literature: AMERICAN JUDICA-
TURE Soc'Y, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION, THE REPORT OF THE THiRD CIRcurr TAsK
FORCE ON FEDERAL RUILE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (1989); C. SHATTER & P.
SANDLER, SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POwERs (2d ed. 1988); Schwarzer,
Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1988); Schwarzer, Sanctions Under
the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985) [hereinafter
Schwarzer, New Federal Rule 11]; Vairo, Amendments to Rules, 97 F.R.D. 165
(1983); and Note, supra note 5. Cooter, 110 S. Ct. at 2454-60.
Among the scores of articles already written on Rule 11, I would rate
those cited by the Court as among the most useful. Specifically, the Vairo arti-
cle, supra, is probably the most comprehensive and widely used on Rule 11. In
preparing this Essay, the work I found most insightful was the student note by
Alan E. Untereiner entitled "A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions,"
supra note 5, cited by the Supreme Court. I wish to express my thanks to Mr.
Untereiner for a most thoughtful piece of work.
7. See Cooter, 110 S. Ct. at 2454; Vairo, supra note 5, at 200-01.
8. E.g., Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 467, 481-84
(N.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 827 F.2d 450 (9th Cir.), va-
cated and remanded, 836 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd and remanded, 898
F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1990) (remanded for reassessment of sanctions in light of
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel, 110 S. Ct. 456 (U.S. 1989)).
9. Each of the cases represented in the Table is cited in the Appendix.
The Table does not include those Rule 11 cases in which a United States Court
of Appeals affirmed a district court's denial of a sanction.
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TABLE
Circuit Col. I Col. II Col. III
D.C. 5 (2) 0 4%
1st5 (1) 0 3%
2d 11 (2) 6 (0) 8%
3d 3 (0) 6 (3) 8%
4th 8 (1) 3 (1) 9%
5th 14 (4) 5 (2) 12%
6th 5 (1) 3 (0) 10%
7th 23 (5) 4 (1) 7%
8th 2 (1) 1 (1) 7%
9th 11 (3) 18 (3) 16%
10th 1 (0) 1 (1) 5%
11th 7 (2) 3 (0) 11%
TOTAL 95 (22) 50 (12) 100%
This Table includes selected Rule 11 cases contained in
published opinions of the United States Courts of Appeals
between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 1989. Column I
shows, by circuit, the number of cases in which the appellate
court either affirmed a sanction against a lawyer, or reversed
and remanded with directions to award a sanction against a
lawyer. Column II shows, by circuit, the number of cases in
which these same courts of appeals reversed sanctions imposed
against a lawyer.1 0 In both columns, the figures in parentheses
show how many of the cases represented by the number
immediately to the left of the number in parentheses imposed
sanctions of ten thousand dollars or more.11 The third column
10. One opinion in which the Ninth Circuit reversed a sanction imposed
on a lawyer by the district court was, on rehearing en banc, vacated and the
full court ruled that some sanctions against attorney Townsend were proper,
but remanded the case "so that the district court can consider whether the
$500 sanction was too high for the offense." Townsend v. Holman Consulting
Corp., 881 F.2d 788, 795-97 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted, 888 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1989),
vacated, 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc). In Willy v. Coastal Corp., 915
F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1990), the court affirmed a reduced sanction against a lawyer
after it had reversed and remanded to the district court to reconsider the
dollar amount of the sanction. 1d. at 968. The later opinions in the Townsend
and Willy cases were handed down in 1990 and thus are not reflected in the
Table.
11. While I took considerable pains to make sure that I found all cases
1991]
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shows each circuit's percentage of the total federal appeals filed
in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1988.12
The Table confirms some of the tentative conclusions
apparent in the judicial opinions and scholarly literature on
Rule 11: the dramatic split between the Third Circuit and
Seventh Circuit. The Third Circuit has applied Rule 11
cautiously, warning against extending the Rule "beyond its text
and intent."13 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has
announced that it will enforce Rule 11 "to the hilt."14 Indeed,
the opinions of Judge Posner and Judge Easterbrook come
close to showing a sense of glee in socking sanctions to lawyers
who file "frivolous" complaints or other papers.15 The Third
Circuit, with eight percent of all federal appellate litigation
(hereinafter "work load"), has approved Rule 11 sanctions
against lawyers in only three percent of the total approvals,
while it has disapproved twelve percent of all disapprovals. In
contrast, the Seventh Circuit, with seven percent of the work
load, has handed down almost a quarter of all Rule 11 opinions
affirming or directing lawyer sanctions, while reversing only
eight percent of the total reversals.
The Table also shows that the Ninth Circuit has approved
or directed Rule 11 sanctions against lawyers eleven times, but
has reversed such sanctions on eighteen occasions. The Ninth
covering the categories described in this Table, almost surely I missed a few.
Nevertheless, I am reasonably confident that any omissions would not
materially affect the comparisons and contrasts among the circuits shown in
the Table. One difficulty in categorizing the cases deserves mention here:
there are several opinions in which the Courts of Appeals did not make clear
whether the Rule 11 sanction affirmed or reversed was against the lawyer or
the client or both. See, e.g., White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 685-
86 (10th Cir. 1990); Teamsters Local Union No. 430 v. Cement Express, Inc.,
841 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988); Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co. v. Fernandez, 830 F.2d 952, 953 (8th Cir. 1987); Davis v. Vesland
Enters., 765 F.2d 494, 496-97 (5th Cir. 1985).
12. See ADMINIsTRATrVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 1989, at 26 (table entitled "U.S. Court of Appeals
Summary - year ended June 30, 1988").
13. Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987). What the
Third Circuit means by extending the Rule "beyond its text and intent" is not
clear.
14. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Dist.
No. 8, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 1986).
15. See Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 851 (1986) (stating that "[ain empty head but a pure heart is no defense"
to an alleged violation of Rule 11); cf. G. Vairo, Rule 11 in the Seventh Circuit
1 (1988) (unpublished manuscript) (describing imposition of Rule 11 sanctions
by the Seventh Circuit as done with "greater enthusiasm and energy" than
any other circuit).
[Vol. 75:793
Circuit thus has reversed sanctions fifty percent more often
than it has either affirmed or directed sanctions. This reversal
rate is in stark contrast to all but the Third Circuit. These
other circuits generally have reversed sanctions approximately
fifty percent less often than they have affirmed or directed
them. Finally, the Table discloses that the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits, which virtually surround the Seventh Circuit to the
East and West, have both approved and disapproved lawyer
sanctions at a rate far below their respective shares of the
federal appellate work load. These inconsistencies among the
circuits demonstrate the ambiguity surrounding Rule 11.
To help resolve these inconsistencies, this Essay proposes
that courts should consider and interpret Rule 11 primarily as a
tool to enforce the Rules of Professional Conduct in litigation
rather than as a means to compensate litigants who become the
victims of unprofessional conduct: deterrence rather than
reimbursement should be the primary purpose of sanctioning
lawyers.16 For many years, state rules have made it unethical
for lawyers to file suits or take other action in litigation that is
legally insupportable or designed to harass the opposing side.17
16. For a decidedly contrary point of view, see Weston, Court-Ordered
Sanctions of Attorneys: A Concept That Duplicates the Role of Attorney
Disciplinary Procedures, 94 DicK. L. REV. 897 (1990), who argues that court-
ordered sanctions are inherently unfair, and that only state disciplinary boards
are capable of policing attorneys. Id. at 921-28. Cf Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp.
v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1542 (9th Cir. 1986), revg 103 F.R.D. 124
(N.D. Cal. 1984), in which the Ninth Circuit in the course of reversing a
sanction ordered by Judge Schwarzer to be paid by the law firm of Kirkland &
Ellis, said. "We must not interpret Rule 11 to create two ladders for after-the-
fact review of asserted unethical conduct; one consisting of sanction
procedures, the other consisting of the well-established bar and court ethical
procedures." I- at 1542. I do not understand this statement but I do think it
expresses a point of view opposite to that in the text of this Essay.
17. See T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL 'RESPONSIBIIY 11-12
(5th ed. 1991); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102
(A)(1)-(2) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1986).
DR 7-102 states in relevant part:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial,
or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or
when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to
harass or maliciously injure another.
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted
under existing law except... [if it] can be supported by good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (A)(1)-(2) (1980).
Rule 3.1 states in relevant part: "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a pro-
ceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for do-
1991] RULEa 11
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The state lawyer-disciplinary bodies, however, have failed to
enforce these provisions.'8 Rule 11 thus offers the federal
courts an opportunity to enforce professional responsibility
rules that state disciplinary bodies have been unable or
unwilling to enforce. To the extent that federal courts
interpret Rule 11 as a device to enforce these Rules, the circuits
should resolve much of their disagreement.
In the balance of this Essay, I begin by considering the
circumstances in which courts can appropriately sanction a
party as distinguished from the counsel for a party. Next, I
consider the nature and purpose of Rule 11 sanctions against
lawyers in the light of my thesis that sanctions should
primarily deter future misconduct rather than compensate
victims of Rule 11 violations. In furtherance of this goal, I
propose that courts appropriately might apportion the receipts
from a monetary sanction between the court and the injured
party. I conclude with suggestions for better correlation of
Rule 11 sanctions with the states' enforcement of the codes of
professional responsibility.
I. ALLOCATING MONETARY SANCTIONS BETWEEN
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT
Courts have not taken a consistent approach to allocating
Rule 11 monetary sanctions between attorneys and clients.
Specifically, confusion exists as to when courts can appropri-
ately impose a sanction on a client, on an attorney, or on both.
Further, courts have failed to develop a workable method for
allocating Rule 11 liability when both the client and the attor-
ney are responsible for the violation.
Some district courts both jointly and severally sanction the
party and the party's counsel without considering their respec-
tive degree of fault.' 9 A slightly different proposal advanced by
ing so that is not frivolous.. . ." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.1 (1983). Either the Code or the Rule has been in effect in most states
since the early 1970s.
18. G. HAZARD, JR., & S. KONiAK, THE LAw AND ETIcS OF LAWYERING
428 (1990) (citing Committee on Legal Ethics v. Douglas, 370 S.E.2d 325, 336
(W. Va. 1988), in which the court urged the Committee to take more seriously
the filing of frivolous litigation).
19. E.g., Jennings v. Joshua Indep. School Dist., 869 F.2d 870, 876-78 (5th
Cir.), modified and reh'g denied, 877 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 3212 (1990); Willys v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1173 (5th Cir. 1988);
McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1340-41 (9th Cir. 1987); Thorn-
ton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1986); cf. Calloway v. Marvel En-
tertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1477 (2d Cir. 1988) (vacating imposition of
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District Judge Schwarzer is that courts may jointly and sever-
ally sanction client and counsel, allowing them to sort out their
respective degree of fault, only when the client's influence on
the lawyer, in part, causes the sanctionable litigation strategy.20
Other courts impose sanctions on clients, as distinguished from
their lawyers, when the lawyer was reasonably misled by the
client as to the accuracy of facts - in short, where the client
lied or failed to tell the whole truth to the lawyer.21
sanctions against client and remanding for reconsideration in light of attor-
ney's responsibility for the Rule 11 violation), rev'd on other grounds sub.
nor. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989).
20. Schwarzer, New Federal Rule 11, supra note 6, at 203; see also cases
cited supra note 19.
21. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc.,
892 F.2d 802, 812-14 (9th Cir. 1990) (sanction against party who was grossly
negligent in filing affidavits in support of motion for preliminary relief), aff 'd,
No. 89-1500, slip op. (U.S. Feb. 26, 1991); Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d
686, 688-90 (7th Cir. 1990) (sanction against plaintiff's attorney reversed where
client had lied to him and attorney had done everything possible to investigate
facts before filing complaint, defendant having refused to discuss claim) (opin-
ion in this case filed in 1990 and hence not included in Appendix); Cross &
Cross Properties v. Everett Allied Co., 886 F.2d 497, 505 (2d Cir. 1989) (re-
manded to district court to "determine whether it was objectively reasonable
for counsel to rely upon his client"); Chevron, Inc. v. Hand, 763 F.2d 1184, 1187
(10th Cir. 1985) (sanction imposed on client because she was "responsible for
the filing of the offending document"); Kappenberger v. Oates, 663 F. Supp.
991, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (attorney unaware of client's perjury); cf Lloyd v.
Schlag, 884 F.2d 409, 410-12 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming imposing of sanctions
against client, but not attorney, although attorney could have discovered with
reasonable inquiry that client's case was without merit).
In Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., decided as
this Essay went to press, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that Rule 11
gives district courts the power to sanction represented parties who sign papers
or pleadings as well as their attorneys. Petitioner, the sanctioned party, ar-
gued that because a party is not required to sign most papers, a party should
not be subject to Rule 11 when it volunteers to do so. No. 89-1500, slip op. at 9.
The Court rejected this position, noting that the plain language of Rule 11
states that parties who sign papers must comply with the same standards of
reasonable inquiry as their attorneys. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court,
explained that for parties and their attorneys, "[t]he essence of Rule 11 is that
signing is no longer a meaningless act; it denotes merit." Id.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the dissenters, argued that the drafters of
the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 intended for attorneys and unrepresented
parties to be the only people required to comply with Rule 11. Id. at 16 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Stevens, and Scalia, JJ.). Kennedy ar-
gued that the Court's decision will not help Rule 11's deterrent purpose
because now, only unwary parties will volunteer to sign papers with their at-
torneys. Id. Additionally, the dissenters argued that only attorneys can assess
whether a document complies with Rule 11. Id. at 18. Under the analysis of
the dissenters, a represented party may be sanctioned only when its attorneys
have violated Rule 11. Id. at 26.
1991]
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Any imposition of joint and several liability creates un-
seemly conflicts between client and lawyer because the rules of
allocation between the two are not clear.22 District courts have
recognized that even when the monetary sanction is imposed on
only the counsel, counsel may shift to the client responsibility
for payment. In response to this threat, courts have entered or-
ders to prohibit such shifting.2s When the court does not specif-
ically allocate responsibility for the Rule 11 violation between
the party and the party's counsel, the counsel is even more
likely to shift responsibility for full payment to the client.
Even when courts do not impose joint liability, but rather im-
pose liability only on the party responsible for the violation, a
conflict of interest can arise between attorney and client be-
cause each may blame the other for the improper conduct.24
This problem is exacerbated because the Rules of Professional
Conduct permit a lawyer to breach the client's privilege if the
lawyer is defending her own conduct.2 In summary, whether
the lawyer is seeking to avoid payment of the monetary sanc-
tion or trying to avoid a sanction all together, it is in the law-
yer's interest to put the blame on the client.
Courts can minimize the intensity of this conflict by adopt-
ing clear rules of allocation. The first step courts should take
toward this goal is eliminating all joint sanctions. Although
Rule 11 permits courts to sanction both attorney and client in
the same case, the Rule does not specifically authorize courts to
impose a joint and several monetary sanction. If a court deter-
mines that both the lawyer and client contributed to a given
22. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 570
(E.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 918
(1987); cf. Note, supra note 5, at 920 (stating that "[j]oint and several sanctions
pose special problems because they actually encourage private shifting of
sanctions").
23. E.g., Markwell v. County of Bexar, 878 F.2d 899, 903-04 (5th Cir. 1989);
Ballard's Serv. Center, Inc. v. Transue, 865 F.2d 447, 450 (1st Cir. 1989); Hat-
teras of Lauderdale, Inc. v. Gemini Lady, 853 F.2d 848 (11th Cir. 1988), qffg
662 F. Supp. 1525 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Burowski v. DePuy, Inc., 850 F.2d 297, 304-05
(7th Cir. 1986); Huettig & Schrom, Inc. v. Landscape Contractor's Council, 790
F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986), affg 582 F. Supp 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
24. See Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir.
1988), rev'd in part sub nom. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment
Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989).
25. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIITY DR 4-101(c)(4)
(1980) (stating that "a lawyer may reveal: ... confidences or secrets necessary
to... defend himself... against an accusation of wrongful conduct"); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1983) (privilege may be
breached "to establish a defense to a... civil claim against the lawyer based
upon conduct in which the client was involved").
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Rule 11 violation, the court should determine each person's de-
gree of responsibility for the sanctionable conduct and then
sanction each person according to their respective degree of re-
sponsibility.26 Further, courts should sanction the client in pro
se cases and in cases where the client has lied to or convinc-
ingly misled the lawyer.
On occasion, courts also can properly sanction corporate
clients even though corporate employees neither lied to nor
misled their lawyer. The typical large corporation involved in
litigation will engage outside counsel for the case. In addition,
house counsel on the regular payroll of the corporation will
give advice to and sometimes engage in behind-the-scenes su-
pervision of outside counsel. Because house counsel rarely if
ever sign any paper filed in litigation, courts cannot hold house
counsel liable for a Rule 11 violation.27 House counsel, how-
ever, may be the person who advocates the conduct that the
court ultimately finds to have violated the Rule. In such situa-
tions, it seems entirely just and proper to direct a sanction
against the corporate plaintiff or defendant who employed the
house counsel. Most Rule 11 cases involve plaintiffs or their
counsel,28 and large corporations are more often defendants
than plaintiffs, courts have seldom had occasion to sanction
large corporations or their counsel for Rule 11 violations.29
In addition to developing specific rules to govern the sanc-
tioning of clients, courts can further help to resolve the Rule,,
11, client-attorney conflict by clearly defining the division of re-
sponsibility between lawyer and client in conducting litigation.
26. See Borowski v. DePuy, Inc., 850 F.2d 297, 305 (7th Cir. 1988). In Cal-
loway, the court said: "We believe that a party represented by an attorney
should not be sanctioned... unless the party had actual knowledge that...
the paper made false statements or was filed for an improper purpose." 854
F.2d at 1474. But see Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications En-
ters., Inc., No. 89-1500, slip op. at 9 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1991) (holding that a repre-
sented party who signs a paper must comply with the reasonable inquiry
requirements of Rule 11 or face sanctions).
27. See Pavelic, 110 S. Ct. at 459-60 (interpreting the phrase "the person
who signed [the pleading]" as meaning the attorney who affixes her signature
to the document and not extending Rule 11 liability to the attorney's firm).
28. In approximately 60 of the 95 cases in Column I in the Table in which
attorneys were sanctioned, the attorneys represented individual plaintiffs.
29. See, ag., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Fernandez, 830 F.2d 952, 956-57
(8th Cir. 1987) (case does not appear in Appendix because not clear from opin-
ion that attorney, as distinguished from client, was sanctioned); Westmoreland
v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1178-80 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Golden Eagle Dis-
tribs. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986), revg 103 F.R.D.
124 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
1991]
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The Rules of Professional Conduct have long been unclear as to
this division.30 Indeed, even the Supreme Court, in the not too
distant past, divided on the question of whether a lawyer must
make an argument on appeal of a criminal case that the client
wants made when the lawyer believes that the argument is un-
sound.3 ' Because the Rule 11 drafters designed the Rule to
eliminate frivolous arguments and legal theories from litiga-
tion,32 courts should interpret Rule 11 to require that lawyers
withstand the pressures of strong-willed clients and withdraw
from representation if necessary rather than take positions in
court that the lawyers believe are unsound, incorrect, or im-
proper.33 This requirement, however, should not apply when
clients lie to or mislead their lawyers concerning facts that are
difficult for the lawyers to check and perhaps also when a cor-
poration's house counsel persuades outside counsel to take a
frivolous position.34
II. MONETARY SANCTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS:
DETERRENCE OR REIMBURSEMENT?
The last sentence of Rule 11 provides for "an appropriate
sanction" and, in addition, provides that a sanction "may in-
clude an order to pay .. . the amount of the reasonable ex-
penses incurred" by the injured party as a result of the
30. See G. HAZARD, JR. & S. KONIAK, supra note 18, at 512-36; C. WOLF-
RAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 154-59 (1986).
31. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1983). The Court held that an
attorney does not have to argue on appeal every non-frivolous issue raised or
requested a client, and that the exercise of an attorney's professional judgment
is consistent with the Constitution's guarantee of effective assistance of coun-
sel. Ia
32. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
33. See In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1985); Mohammed v.
Union Carbide Corp., 606 F. Supp. 252, 261 (E.D. Mich. 1985); cf. Calloway v.
Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1470, 1474 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that
when client does not realize that participation in or signing a pleading is
wrong, the attorney has an obligation to prevent wrongful conduct), rev'd in
part sub nom. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989). But see
Vairo, supra note 5, at 227 (arguing that both attorney and client should be
sanctioned in this situation).
34. For instance, in Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications En-
ters., Inc., No. 89-1500, slip op. (U.S. Feb. 26, 1991), the sanctioned party was a
publisher that had developed its own sophisticated system for detecting
whether others were illegally reproducing its copyrighted material. The pub-
lisher ordered its law firm to draft a complaint based upon violations its sys-
tem had detected that were later revealed to be false. The Court stated that:
"Quite often it is the client, not the attorney, who is better positioned to inves-
tigate the facts supporting a paper or pleading." Id at 13.
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offending conduct, "including a reasonable attorney's fee."s5
This language contains the seeds that have led to the conflict
among the circuits. On the one hand, most courts, including
the Supreme Court, have stated that the purpose of a sanction
is to deter a wayward attorney from repeating a violation of the
Rule's injunctions.3 6 On the other hand, the Rule, by permit-
ting a sanction equal to the amount necessary to reimburse the
party injured for the expenses of defending against a position
that violated the Rule, suggests that compensation or reim-
bursement is the principal or, at least, an important purpose of
Rule 11.37 In fact, this Rule 11 language has led to a debate
over whether Rule 11 is a fee shifting device.38 This debate is
misconceived. Because the current trend is to sanction attor-
neys rather than clients, references in the "fee-shifting" debate
to the American rule as contrasted with the English rule are ir-
relevant. The debate, however, demonstrated that, although
the Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of Rule 11 is de-
terrence, some confusion as to its purpose still exists.
This confusion as to the purpose of Rule 11 has led to con-
flict among the authorities over the standard courts should use
to determine the nature and the amount of Rule 11 sanctions.3 9
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, reprinted in 2A J. MOORE, J. LUCAST & G. GRo-
THEER, supra note 1, at 11.01.
36. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2554 (1990);
Note, supra note 5, at 906-07.
37. See, e.g., Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & 0 Enters., 886 F.2d 1485, 1496 (7th Cir.
1989); Note, supra note 5, at 907 n.47.
38. See Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1988).
Judge Posner said in Hays that "Rule 11 is a fee-shifting statute." 847 F.2d at
419. Several months later, Judge Easterbrook said for the same court, this
time sitting en banc, that "Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting statute in the sense that
the loser pays." Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank B.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932
(7th Cir. 1988) (en banc). The Third Circuit takes the position that the "goal"
of Rule 11 is "not wholesale fee shifting but correction of litigation abuse."
Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3dCir. 1987).
This debate was settled by the Court in Cooter, when Justice O'Connor,
writing for a unanimous Court, stated that the central goal of Rule 11 is deter-
rence. 110 S. Ct. at 2454. The Court noted that Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting
device: "Such a sanction may, but need not, include payment of the other par-
ties' expenses." Id.
39. Compare Vairo, supra note 5, at 232 (arguing that sanctions should not
be used as a routine fee-shifting device) and AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOC'Y,
supra note 6, at xv (stating that court should impose the least severe sanction
necessary to attain goal of specific deterrence and avoid full-expense fee-shift-
ing) with Rowe, ALI Study on Paths to a Better Way, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 890-
91 (arguing that threat of fee-shifting needed to deter frivolous claims). See
also Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.
1987) (holding court not required to award the full amount of attorney's fees
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In the oft-cited case, Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc.,
Judge Johnson for the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc stated that
the sanction imposed should be "the least severe sanction ade-
quate to the purpose of Rule 11.''40 In contrast, the Seventh
Circuit, at times, apparently regards Rule 11 as requiring the
offending party or the party's attorney to reimburse the oppos-
ing party for the costs of defending against the frivolous action.
The debate over the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is impor-
tant because the sanction, whether monetary or not, necessary
to deter a lawyer from repeating a violation of Rule 11 usually
is quite different, either in kind or amount, than the sanction
necessary to reimburse the aggrieved party for its expenses.
For example, a sanction requiring a civil rights lawyer to pay
an amount equal to the aggrieved party's "expenses... includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee" can be draconian and could
bankrupt the lawyer.41 Such lawyers typically are not highly
paid. Thus, a sanction much smaller than is necessary to com-
pensate the aggrieved party probably would effectively deter
future misconduct. Accordingly, if deterrence is Rule l1's goal,
as the courts proclaim, a court should focus on whether a given
sanction improves or enhances professional responsibility and
only secondarily on whether the sanction compensates the vic-
tim of the Rule 11 violation. In doing so, a court can still prop-
erly consider the costs unnecessarily imposed by the sanctioned
that non-violating party incurred in defending against action leading to Rule
11 violations), cert denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
40. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988).
The court in Thomas stated that "what is 'appropriate' [for a sanction] may be
a warm friendly discussion on the record, a hard-nosed reprimand in open
court, compulsory legal education, monetary sanctions or other measures ...
the district court should utilize the sanction that... is the least severe sanc-
tion adequate to such purpose." Id Accord Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466-
67 (4th Cir. 1987).
41. See Jennings v. Joshua Indep. School Dist., 869 F.2d 870, modified and
reh'g denied, 877 F.2d 313, 322 (5th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3212
(1990). Here, a district court sanctioned a lawyer who sued a school district
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), for searching a student's automobile for drugs
even though the trial court had denied a defense motion for summary judg-
ment and the case was tried. Id. The Jennings case, which the American Civil
Liberties Union supported, id. at 877, is another example of a case that has
spawned considerable satellite litigation. See supra note 8 and accompanying
text. On remand by the Fifth Circuit to the district court for reconsideration
of the sanction, the district court reduced the original sanction of approxi-
mately $84,000 by 50%. See Jennings v. Joshua Indep. School Dist., No. 3-85-
1700, slip op. (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 1990) (order concerning attorneys fees after
remand). The plaintiffs and their attorneys will appeal once again to the Fifth
Circuit. Letter from counsel Don Gladden to Victor Kramer (Oct. 31, 1990).
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attorney on his or her opponent's client. A court, however, also
should consider other factors when calculating the amount of a
sanction. The Rule 11 language permitting a sanction in the
amount of the aggrieved party's attorney's fee does not man-
date otherwise.
One factor a court should consider when determining the
kind and amount of a sanction is the deterrent effect achieved
by simply imposing any sanction. Arguably, the public censure
implicit in the imposition of a sanction and the resulting effect
on a lawyer's reputation is itself a strong deterrent.42 In fact, if
deterrence is the sole purpose of Rule 11 and the publicity sur-
rounding a Rule 11 sanction is sufficient to affect a lawyer's
reputation, the amount of the sanction in dollars could always
be relatively low.
The deterrent effect of a monetary sanction on a lawyer
would seem to vary depending on many factors, perhaps the
most important of which are the lawyer's income, the amount
of his or her personal capital, and the size and wealth of the
firm, if any, with which the lawyer is associated. For example,
to achieve the same degree of deterrence, a court would have to
impose on a partner in a large New York corporate law firm a
sanction many times larger than the amount imposed on a typi-
cal trial lawyer in the average small law firm. Moreover, this
difference is aggravated because the large corporate firm is
likely to reimburse the partner for the amount of the sanc-
tion.43 Thus, when calculating the amount of a sanction, the of-
fending lawyer's ability to pay should be as important a
consideration as compensating the aggrieved party.
Courts have expressly or implicitly recognized this consid-
eration. In several cases, the court expressly stated that it must
take into account the offending lawyer's ability to pay when de-
42. See Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 881 F.2d 788, 790 n.1 (9th
Cir.), reh'g granted, 888 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated, 914 F.2d 1136 (9th
Cir. 1990) (en banc); FDIC v. Tefken Constr. & Installation Co., 847 F.2d 440,
444 (7th Cir. 1988).
43. It can be argued that the purpose of Rule 11 would be thwarted if a
law firm were to reimburse one of its professionally irresponsible partners.
Nevertheless, this situation is not to be confused with the argument that cli-
ents should not be permitted to reimburse their lawyers for the lawyers' viola-
tions of Rule 11 because to do so "would interfere with the courts' attempt to
maintain discipline." The quotation is from Judge Weinstein's opinion in
Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 570
(E.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 821 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 918
(1987).
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termining the amount of the sanction.44 There are also several
cases in which the court, while treating the reasonable attor-
ney's fees of the aggrieved party as the starting point, fixed the
amount of the sanction at a figure far below the prevailing
side's fees and other expenses.45 Indeed, most monetary sanc-
tions have been for relatively small dollar amounts; in only
about a quarter of the cases in the above Table was the sanction
as high as ten thousand dollars.46 Although this Table repre-
sents only those cases in which a sanctioned attorney appealed
the district court's judgment, an attorney sanctioned in an
amount of ten thousand dollars or more probably would appeal
the sanctioning judgment.
Some courts have justified reducing sanctions below the ag-
grieved parties' costs on the grounds that the efforts expended
to defend against the frivolous positions were unreasonably ex-
tensive, unreasonably expensive, or both.47  In addition,
through application of the doctrine of mitigation, courts fre-
quently reduce sanctions below the fees requested by the ag-
grieved parties because the aggrieved parties' attorneys failed
to take steps to reduce the costs of opposing the sanctioned con-
duct.48 In sum, many cases exist in which the court refused to
reimburse the injured party for its total attorney's fee because
the fee was unreasonable, because, viewed as a sanction, the fee
was inappropriately high, or because the fee was beyond the
lawyer's ability to pay. Judges, in such cases, wisely read the
last sentence of Rule 11 as if it provided for payment of all, or
an appropriate percentage, of the injured party's reasonable at-
44. See, e.g., Jackson v. Law Firm of O'Hara, Ruberg, Osgood & Taylor,
875 F.2d 1224, 1229-30 (6th Cir. 1989); Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1988); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d
1265, 1281 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987) (sanctions reversed);
cf. Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & 0 Enters., Inc., 886 F.2d 1485, 1496 (7th Cir. 1989)
(sanction in excess of $45,000 imposed on attorney Eugene F. Friedman despite
fact that the amount constituted a "hardship" on him).
45. See, e.g., Jackson, 875 F.2d at 1230; INVST Fin. Group, Inc. v. Chem-
Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 406 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927
(1987); Eastway, 637 F. Supp. at 572.
46. See Appendix for cases in which sanctions totaled at least $10,000.
The largest sanction was that against attorney Joseph L. Alioto in the sum of
$294,141.10 in the case of Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 809 F.2d, 548,
559 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 822 (1987); cf. Brandt v. Schal Assocs., Inc.,
131 F.R.D. 512, 522 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (imposing sanctions of $443,564.66).
47. See, e.g., INVST Fin. Group, 815 F.2d at 404.
48. See, e.g., Jackson, 875 F.2d at 1230; Dubiskey v. Owens, 849 F.2d 1034,
1039 (7th Cir. 1989); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987);
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 572 (E.D.N.Y.
1986), modified, 821 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
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torney's fee. This interpretation is a sensible way of reconciling
Rule l1's purpose of deterrence with the purpose of compensat-
ing the victim suggested in the Rule's last sentence.
III. REQUIRING SANCTIONED PARTIES AND
ATTORNEYS TO PAY A PORTION OF THE
SANCTION TO THE COURT
To further enhance the usefulness of Rule 11, district
courts should consider adopting a local rule that requires a
sanctioned party or attorney to pay to the court a specified per-
centage of every Rule 11 monetary sanction. I have found only
one appellate court opinion approving such a payment.49 No
Rule 11 language, however, requires that sanctioned parties or
attorneys pay monetary sanctions exclusively to prevailing liti-
gants. In fact, reasons exist for apportioning cash payments by
offending parties or lawyers between district courts and ag-
grieved parties.
Rule 11 speaks of "appropriate" sanctions. Partial reim-
bursement of courts for needless expenditure of time seems en-
tirely appropriate. Opposing parties are not the only entities
injured by Rule 11 violations; courts (and ultimately the tax-
payers) also are injured, having had to spend time needlessly
on frivolous cases arid legal maneuvers. Thus, a rule requiring
sanctioned parties to pay a portion of sanctions to courts would
shift at least a fraction of the costs of operating the judicial sys-
tem to those who unjustifiably contribute to increasing those
costs. Such a rule also would serve the salutary purpose of re-
minding litigants and their attorneys that frivolous litigation
aggrieves not only opposing parties, but also the courts.
49. See Four Keys Leasing & Maintenance Corp. v. Simithis, 849 F.2d 770,
772 (2d Cir. 1988) (court ordered the attorney to pay $2,500 in legal fees and an
additional $2,500 fine to the court). In Adduono v. World Hockey Ass'n., 109
F.R.D. 375 (D. Minn. 1986), rev'd, 824 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1987), District Judge
Alsop required plaintiff's lawyer to pay a $5,000 sanction to defendant and a
$5,000 "fine," imposed pursuant to the court's inherent power to regulate at-
torney conduct, to be paid to the World Hockey Association and to the Na-
tional Hockley League. Id at 380-81. The Eighth Circuit reversed because the
sanction was not based on the sanctioned attorney's signature or a paper filed
in court. 824 F.2d at 621. Cf. Lemeli v. INS, 737 F.2d 824, 824 (9th Cir. 1984)
(fine payable to Ninth Circuit court clerk imposed but not under Rule 11); see
also Schwarzer, New Federal Rule 11, supra note 6, at 202 (stating that "[tlo
impose a fine under Rule 11 without extending the procedural protections of
criminal contempt proceedings risks reversal on appeal and is inadvisable").
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IV. PUBLICIZING IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AND
REPORTING THEIR IMPOSITION TO STATE
DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITIES
To maximize the deterrent effect of Rule 11 sanctions,
courts should ensure that the identity of sanctioned lawyers is a
matter of public record, and should routinely report imposition
of sanctions on lawyers to the state bar disciplinary bodies of
the fifty states.50 Unfortunately, district courts sometimes im-
pose sanctions without filing published opinions, and appellate
court opinions all too often fail to make clear whether the dis-
trict court imposed the sanction on the client, the client's law-
yer, or both.51 As a result, it is impossible to know on whom
the court imposed a sanction, at least without going to the rec-
ord in the district clerk's office. Although a reviewing court
may be understandably reluctant to publicize the name of a
sanctioned attorney when the lower court improperly imposed
the sanction,52 it is difficult to justify anonymity when the ap-
pellate court affirms the sanction. As noted above, the adverse
publicity to a sanctioned lawyer can be an important part of the
deterrent effect of sanctions.53 If the public is not made aware
of the discipline, the professional ignominy of having been sanc-
tioned or otherwise disciplined is far less intense5 4
Once a court has imposed a sanction on an attorney, it is
difficult to justify not reporting the sanction to the disciplinary
body of the jurisdiction which has authorized the sanctioned at-
torney to engage in the practice of law. Reporting of Rule 11
sanctions will give state disciplinary authorities an opportunity
to review the records of attorneys who previously had violated
50. Where a sanction is reversed on appeal, care must be taken to notify
the state disciplinary authorities though the erroneously sanctioned attorney
can be relied on to make sure that the record is corrected. The Seventh Cir-
cuit in at least two cases has referred attorneys to their state bar to consider
taking disciplinary action or investigation. See Steinle v. Warren, 765 F.2d 95,
102 (7th Cir. 1985); Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 89 (7th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert denied, 474 U.S. 827 (1985). In the former case the court directed
its clerk "to transmit as promptly as practicable to the Board of Attorneys
Professional Responsibility, Madison, Wisconsin, a certified copy of the record
in this case including a copy of this opinion, for such disciplinary action as that
Committee may consider appropriate." Steinle, 765 F.2d at 102.
51. See cases cited supra note 12.
52. See Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 881 F.2d 788, 790 (9th
Cir.), reh'g granted, 888 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated, 914 F.2d 1136 (9th
Cir. 1990) (en banc).
53. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
54. This may be a reason why the Bar has been so reluctant over the
years to conduct disciplinary proceedings in public.
[Vol. 75:793
RULE 11
the state's code of professional responsibility in light of their
Rule 11 violations. Regular reporting of all Rule 11 sanctions to
state disciplinary authorities also would disclose multiple Rule
11 sanctions against the same lawyer.55 To effectively use this
information, state disciplinary bodies should investigate every
lawyer who has received more than one Rule 11 sanction. Re-
porting by federal district clerks to state authorities would
make this salutary practice possible.
CONCLUSION
The tendency of many federal judges to use Rule 11 as a
fee-shifting device is an important reason why the Rule has cre-
ated so much controversy and criticism. This Essay argues that
courts primarily should use Rule 11 to improve the professional
responsibility of litigators in the federal courts by imposing
sanctions on lawyers who abuse the processes of the courts.
Such sanctions can and should include a reasonable fine paya-
ble to the district court in which the Rule violation occurred. If
Rule 11 is regarded as a disciplinary rule for lawyers, I believe
it will be more effective and will ultimately achieve greater ac-
ceptance among members of the federal court bars.
55. Although my review of the cases contained in the above Table has un-
covered no instances of sanctions imposed on a lawyer in more than one case,
this Table is not comprehensive. My study of Rule 11 cases was confined to
those cases in which sanctions against lawyers were appealed and does not in-
clude opinions dated after December 31, 1989. See also In re Kunstler, 914
F.2d 505, 525 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating in dicta that a court might increase a sanc-
tion against an attorney if the attorney has already been sanctioned to enhance
the deterrent effect of the sanction).
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APPENDIX
This Appendix cites in numerical order of the circuits, af-
ter the D.C. Circuit, and alphabetically within each circuit, each
case included shown in Columns I and II respectively of the Ta-
ble above. Cases in which a district court imposed sanctions in
the sum of $10,000 or more have an asterisk at the beginning of
the citation.
COLUMN I
*Danik, Inc. v. Harmarx, 875 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'd sub
nom. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990);
McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1986); *Perkin-
son v. Gilbert/Robinson, Inc., 821 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 2172 (1990); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168
(D.C. Cir. 1985); Alvarado-Morales v. Digital Equip. Corp., 843
F.2d 613 (1st Cir. 1988); Ballard's Serv. Center, Inc. v. Transue,
865 F.2d 447 (1st Cir. 1989); EBI, Inc. v. Gator Indus., 807 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1986); *Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d
600 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Quin, 836 F.2d 654 (1st Cir.
1988); Bartel Dental Books, Inc. v. Schultz, 786 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1006 (1986); *Calloway v. Marvel
Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd in part
sub nom. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,
110 S. Ct. 456 (1989); *Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New
York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987);
Four Keys Leasing & Maintenance Co. v. Simithis, 849 F.2d 770
(2d Cir. 1988); Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1986);
Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1989); *In-
ternational Shipping Co. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 875 F.2d 388
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 563 (1989); Tedeschi v. Smith
Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 757 F.2d 465 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985); Tuvia Ben Shmuel Yosef v. Passama-
quoddy Tribe, 876 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1474 (1990); United States v. Carley, 783 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986); City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator
Co., 844 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1988); Doering v. Union County Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1988); Ford v. Temple
Hosp., 790 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1986); Napier v. Thirty or More Un-
identified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080 (3d Cir. 1988); Basch v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 777 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986); Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.
1987); Chu by Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1985); Cleve-
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land Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F.2d 984 (4th
Cir. 1987); Cohen v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 788 F.2d 247
(4th Cir. 1986); Dalton v. United States, 800 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987); *Fahrenz v. Meadow
Farm Partnership, 850 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1988); Langham-Hill
Petroleum, Inc. v. Southern Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 1327 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 829 (1987); Barrios v. Pelham Marine, Inc.,
796 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1986); Brown v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
805 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986); *Chapman & Cole v. Itel
Container Int'l B.V., 865 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 201 (1989); *In re Ginther, 791 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir.
1986); Hale v. (Judge) Harney, 786 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1986);
Howell v. Sup. Ct. of Texas, 885 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 3213 (1990); *Jennings v. Joshua Ind. School
Dist., 869 F.2d 870 (5th Cir), modified and reh'g denied, 877
F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3212 (1990);
Markwell v. County of Bexar, 878 F.2d 899 (5th Cir. 1989); Pin
v. Texaco, Inc., 793 F.2d 1448 (5th Cir. 1986); Robinson v. Na-
tional Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1987); Saint
Amant v. Bernard, 859 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1988); Southern Leas-
ing Partners, Ltd. v. McMullan, 801 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1986);
*Truck Treads, Inc. v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 868 F.2d 1472
(5th Cir. 1989); Veillon v. Exploration Services, 876 F.2d 1197
(5th Cir. 1989); Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir.
1986); Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332 (6th Cir.
1988); *INVST Fin. Group, Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815
F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927 (1987); Jack-
son v. Law Firm of O'Hara, Ruberg, Osborne & Taylor, 875 F.2d
1224 (6th Cir. 1989); Lemaster v. United States, 891 F.2d 115
(6th Cir. 1989); Brown v. National Bd. of Med. Examiners, 800
F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1986); *Burowski v. DePuy, Inc., 850 F.2d 297
(7th Cir. 1988); Cannon v. Loyola Univ., 784 F.2d 777 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Dreis & Crump Mfg.
Co. v. International Assn. of Machinists, 802 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.
1986); Frantz v. United States Powerlifting Fed'n, 836 F.2d 1063
(7th Cir. 1987); Frazier v. Cast, 771 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1985);
*Hamer v. County of Lake, 871 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 146 (1989); Hapaniewski v. City of Chicago
Hgts., 883 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1116
(1990); *Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir.
1988); Insurance Benefit Adm'rs v. Martin, 871 F.2d 1354 (7th
Cir. 1989); *Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & 0 Enters., Inc., 886 F.2d 1485
(7th Cir. 1989); Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 827 (1985); Local 106 v. Homeway Memo-
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rial Gardens, Inc., 838 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1988); Magnus Elecs.,
Inc. v. Masco Corp., 871 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 237 (1989); Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank, N.A., 880
F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989); Medical Emergency Serv. Assoc. v.
Foulke, 844 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1988); Ordower v. Feldman, 826
F.2d 1569 (7th Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc.,
771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Ronco, Inc., 838 F.2d 212 (7th
Cir. 1988); S.A. Auto Lube, Inc. v. Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc., 842 F.2d
946 (7th Cir. 1988); Fred A. Smith Lumber Co. v. Edidin, 845
F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1988); *Steinle v. Warren, 765 F.2d 95 (7th
Cir. 1985); Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d
583 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 129 (1990); EEOC v.
Milavetz & Assocs., 863 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1988); *Lupo v. R.
Rowland & Co., 857 F.2d 482 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 2101 (1989); Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230 (9th
Cir. 1986); Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 836 F.2d 1156
(9th Cir. 1987); Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contrac-
tors Council, 790 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986); *In re Itel Sec. Litig.,
791 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987);
*King v. Idaho Funeral Serv. Ass'n, 862 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1988);
McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1987);
MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1986); In
re Disciplinary Action against (Paul) Mooney, 841 F.2d 1003
(9th Cir. 1988); Pipe Trades Council Local 159 v. Underground
Contractors Ass'n, 835 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1987); Pony Express
Courier v. Pony Express Delivery, 872 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1989);
*Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822 (1987); Monument Builders v. Ameri-
can Cemetary Ass'n, 891 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir. 1989); *Blackwell
v. Dep't of Offender Rehabilitation, 807 F.2d 914 (l1th Cir.
1987); Collins v. Walden, 834 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1987); DeSisto
College, Inc. v. Line, 888 F.2d 755 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 2219 (1990); Hatteras of Lauderdale, Inc. v. Gemini
Lady, 853 F.2d 848 (11th Cir. 1988); Jorgenson v. Volusia
County, 846 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1988); *Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp. v. Sona Distribs., 847 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Milam, 855 F.2d 739 (11th Cir. 1988).
COLUMN II
Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.
1986); Mercado v. United States Customs Serv., 873 F.2d 641 (2d
Cir. 1989); *Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987); Sanko S.S. Co., Ltd. v. Galin,
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835 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1987); *Dura Systems, Inc. v. Rothbury In-
vestments, Ltd., 886 F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 844 (1990); Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman,
775 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1985); Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle,
847 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1988); *Napier v. Thirty or More Unidenti-
fied Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080 (3d Cir. 1988); *Schering Corp.
v. Vitarine Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 889 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1989);
Snow Machines, Inc. v. Hedco, Inc., 838 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1988);
Introcaso v. Cunningham, 857 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1988); Kirby v.
Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1987); Stevens
v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 1056 (4th Cir. 1986);
Foval v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 841 F.2d 126 (5th Cir.
1988); Harmony Drilling Co. v. Kreutter, 846 F.2d 17 (5th Cir.
1988); Kucel v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67 (5th Cir.
1987); *Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n,
844 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1988); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d
1160 (5th Cir. 1988); Century Prod. Inc. v. Sutter, 837 F.2d 247
(6th Cir. 1988); Davis v. Crush, 862 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1988); In re
Summers, 863 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1988); Brown v. Federation of
State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1987); FDIC v.
Tekfen Constr. & Installation Co., 847 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1988);
Lebovitz v. Miller, 856 F.2d 902 (7th Cir. 1988); Magnus Elecs.,
Inc. v. La Republica Argentina, 830 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1987);
*Adduono v. World Hockey Ass'n, 824 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1987);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Alla Medical Servs., Inc., 855 F.2d 1470
(9th Cir. 1988); In re Akros Installations, Inc., 834 F.2d 1526
(9th Cir. 1987); Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877 (9th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1532 (1989); California Archi-
tectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d
1466 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988); Cunning-
ham v. County of Los Angeles, 869 F.2d 427 (9th Cir.), vacated,
879 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990);
Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531
(9th Cir. 1986); Great Hawaiian Fin. Corp. v. Aiu, 863 F.2d 617
(9th Cir. 1988); Tom Growney Equip., Inc. v. Shelley Irrigation
Dev., Inc., :834 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1987); *Jensen Elec. Co. v.
Moore, Caldwell, Rowland & Dodd, Inc., 873 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir.
1989); Lacina v. G-K Trucking, 802 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. granted and vacated, 483 U.S. 1003 (1987), on remand, 822
F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1987), appeal after remand, 877 F.2d 741 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 563 (1989); Lemos v. Fend, 828
F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1987); Mossman v. Roadway Express, Inc., 789
F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1986); Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831
F.2d 1503 (9th Cir. 1987); Townsend v. Holman Consulting
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Corp., 881 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989); United Energy Owners
Comm., Inc. v. United States Energy Management Sys., Inc.,
837 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1988); Woodrum v. Woodward County,
866 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, mod-
ified and reh'g denied, 803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1986), mandamus
granted sub nom. Brown v. Baden, 815 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987); *Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles,
780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986); O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 875
F.2d 1465 (10th Cir. 1989); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop
v. Associated Contractors, Inc., 888 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1133 (1990); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d
1551 (11th Cir. 1987); Threaf Properties, Ltd. v. Title Ins. Co.,
875 F.2d 831 (11th Cir. 1989).
